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QUESTIONS PRESENTED 
1) Does a person_waive his right to contest on appeal an 
issue which he conceded at trial? 
2) Under·the Uniform Commercial Code, does a wrongful 
revocation of acceptance of goods give rise to an action 
for the price? 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendant-Appellant has filed an Appeal and in his brief 
has made a statement of facts setting forth the facts as most 
favorable to his position. Respondent wishes only to state 
that, contrary to the allegation in Appellant's Statement of 
the Kind of Case, Appellant in fact made a down payment of $310.00 
on the organ (transcript of trial, p. 108, line 23), and that, 
contrary to Appellant's Statement of Facts, the organ is presently 
in Appellant's garage, and not in his home (transcript of trial, 
p. 100, line 4). In all other respects, Respondent 'accepts 
Appellant's Statement of Facts. 
POINT I 
APPELLANT SHOULD BE ESTOPPED ON APPEAL FROM RAISING THE 
ISSUE OF ACCEPTANCE. 
Counsel for Appellant states in his brief: "The issue 
primarily centers around the appropriate measure of damages." 
(p. 1). He then correctly observes that the issue of damages 
hinges on whether or not Appellant accepted the goods in question. 
He goes to great lengths to argue that since Appellant effectively 
rejected the organ which he purchased from Respondent, he should 
be liable only for the damages which he caused Respondent, arvi net 
for the contract price. It is interesting to note, however, th'' 
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during the discussion regarding jury instructions, Appellant's 
attorney conceded that Appellant accepted the organ, and he 
did not submit any jury instructions on that question. At 
that time, the defense asserted by Appellant was that of 
unconscionability, and there was no evidence at all before 
the trial court that the organ was not accepted by the 
Appellant, that it was nonconforming, or that Appellant had 
not had ample time to inspect it. Therefore.the trial court 
ruled, as a matter of law, that there was acceptance on the 
part of the Appellant (record, p. 122). Ironically, only 
after the jury found no unconscionability did Appellant 
forward his theory of nonacceptance. 
It is a well-established legal principle that on appeal, 
parties waive their right to contest issues which they 
failed to contest at trial. Five (5) Am. Jur. 2d, Appeal 
and Error §545 (1962) states: 
In order to avoid the delay and expense incident 
to appeals, reversals, and new trials upon 
grounds which might have been corrected in the 
trial court if the question had been properly 
raised there, the appellate courts have developed 
and applied the rule that they will normally 
only consider questions which were raised and 
reserved in the lower court. 
See also 5 Am. Jur. 2d, Appeal and Error §566 (1962); 
McGrath vs. Manufacturers Trust Co., 338 u.s. 241; and 
State vs. Woolman, 84 Utah 23, 33 P.2d 640. In the case of 
Whewell vs. Dobson, 227 N.W. 2d 115 (1975), it was held that 
the buyer of Christmas trees was precluded from arguing on 
appeal that the seller failed to perform certain conditions 
precedent to his recovery from an action on the price, where 
the buyer did not raise those issues at trial. In the 
-2-
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instant case, Appellant, as buyer, is now likewise attempting 
to argue on appeal that the Respondent cannot recover the 
contract price because of the buyer's non-acceptance of the 
organ. It seems patently unfair that Appellant, after 
losing the issue of unconscionability at trial, can now 
appeal his case on the entirely new theory of non-acceptance, 
and it is therefore urged that-Appellant be estopped from 
now claiming non-acceptance of the organ. 
POINT II 
EVEN IF APPELLANT IS PERMITTED TO ARGUE HIS THEORY OF NON-
ACCEPTANCE, THE FACTS INDICATE THAT APPELLANT INDEED ACCEPTED 
THE ORGAN, AND SUBSEQUENTLY WRONGFULLY REVOKED THAT ACCEPTANCE. 
From the outset we need to establish that under the 
Uniform Commercial Code, there is a big difference between a 
buyer's rejection of goods and his revocation of acceptance. 
White and Summers note that distinction and state: 
Rejection is a combination of the buyer's 
refusal to keep delivered goods and his 
notification to the seller that he will 
not keep them. Revocation of acceptance 
is a similar refusal in the buyer's part 
to keep goods, but in this case it is a 
refusal which comes at a later time in the 
transaction and after the buyer has "accepted" 
by allowing the time for rejection to pass 
or by some act with respect to the goods. 
White and Summers, Uniform Commercial Code 
247 (1972). 
Nowhere does the Code define "rejection", but it does 
define "acceptance". 
Section 2-606 of the Uniform Commercial Code states: 
(1} Acceptance of goods occurs when the buyer 
(a} after a reasonable opportunity to 
inspect the goods signifies to the 
seller that the goods are conform-
ing or that he will take or retain_ 
them in spite of their non-conform1ty; 
or 
-3-
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(b) fails to make an effective rejection 
(subsection (l) of Section 2-602), 
but such acceptance does not occur 
until the buyer has had a reasonable 
opportunity to inspect them; or 
(c) does any act inconsistent with the 
seller's ownership; but if such act 
is wrongful as against the seller 
it is an acceptance only if ratified 
by him. 
Comment one ( l l under that same section states: "If 
the goods conform to the contract, acceptance amounts only 
to the performance by the buyer of one part of his legal 
obligation." See also 2 Anderson, Uniform Commercial Code 
190 (2nd Ed. 1971). According to comment three (3), "payment 
made after tender is always one circumstance tending to 
signify acceptance of the goods but in itself it can never 
be more than one circumstance and is not conclusive." See 
66 Am. Jur. 2d Sales §385 (1962), where it states: "If the 
buyer pays for the goods or signifies that he will pay for 
them, at least where advance payment or payment prior to 
examination is not required, the buyer will be deemed to 
have accepted the goods. Moreover, it is indicated that the 
act of the buyer in arranging for payment on a deferred or 
other basis may constitute acceptance under the Code." It 
therefore appears from the foregoing that after the seller 
tenders the goods, the buyer has a reasonable period of time 
in which to inspect them, "not only for their conformity, 
but also as to whether he wants to take them at all." 
Peters, "Remedies for Breach of Contracts Relating to Sale 
of Goods Under the Uniform Commercial Code: A Road Map for 
-4-
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Article 2, 1973 Yale Law Journal 199, 241 (1953). Also see 
Appellant's brief, pps. 6-7. If the buyer does not reject 
the goods, or if he signifies to the seller [by paying the 
price, etc.] that the goods are conforming or that he will 
take or retain them in spite of their non-conformity, then 
he has accepted them (§2-606). After acceptance, the buyer 
has no legal right to return the goods to the seller, whether 
he wants to or not, unless the goods are nonc.onforrning, and 
unless the buyer seasonably notifies the seller of such 
nonconformity (§2-608). 
In the instant case Appellant did not reject the organ, 
but instead revoked his acceptance of it. The trial clearly 
established that Appellant received in his horne tender of 
the organ. By agreement between the parties, he was given 
two days to inspect it for its conformity and to decide if 
he wanted to buy it at all. Subsequently Appellant decided 
he wanted to keep it, and so he made a down payment and 
signed the Installment Sale Contract. At the moment he 
signed his name, Appellant accepted the organ, and said in 
effect, "I promise to pay for this unless it proves to be 
nonconforming." See White and Summers p. 212. Two days 
later, Appellant revoked his acceptance, and breached his 
contract. There was nothing wrong with the organ. It 
conformed in every respect to Respondent's representations. 
Nevertheless, Appellant simply decided that he didn't want 
it after all. He therefore wrongfully revoked his acceptance. 
-5-
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POINT III 
APPELLANT'S WRONGFUL REVOCATION OF ACCEPTANCE GAVE TO RESPONDENT 
AN ACTION FOR THE PRICE UNDER THE UTAH UNIFORM COMMERCIAL 
CODE §2-709. 
When Appellant accepted the organ, he became liable for 
the contract price. Section 2-607 of the Uniform Commercial 
Code states in part: 
(1) The buyer must pay at the contract rate 
for any goods accepted. 
(2) Acceptance of goods by the buyer precludes 
rejection of the goods accepted. 
Comment one (1) under that section further provides 
that "Once the buyer accepts a tender, the seller acquires a 
right to its price on the contract terms." 
When Appellant wrongfully revoked his acceptance, 
Respondent was afforded by the contract the appropriate 
remedies under the Uniform Commercial Code. Section 2-703 
speaks of the seller's remedies both for wrongful rejection 
and for wrongful revocation of acceptance. It states: 
Where the buyer wrongfully rejects or revokes 
acceptance of goods . . • the aggrieved seller 
may • . . recover damages for non-acceptance 
(Section 2-708) or in a proper case the price 
(Section 2-709). 
The distinction between wrongful rejection and wrongful 
revocation of acceptance now becomes crucial. Wrongful 
rejection--or "non-acceptance"--permits an aggrieved seller 
to recover only damages under §2-708, while wrongful revocation 
of acceptance is the "proper case" for an aggrieved seller 
to recover the price under §2-709. That section (2-709) 
states: 
(1) When the buyer fails to pay the price 
as it becomes due the seller may re-
cover, together with any incidental 
-h-
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damages under the next section, the 
price (a) of goods accepted 
Comment two (2) further states: 
(2) The action for the price is now generally 
limited to those cases where resale of 
the goods is impracticable except where 
the buyer has accepted the goods or where 
they have been destroyed after risk of 
loss has passed to the buyer. (underlining 
added) 
A proper reading of.the rest of §2-709 clearly shows 
that the above quoted portion is, the part which correctly 
applies to the instant case, and is totally consistent with 
§2-607 and with §2-703. 
In his brief for the case at bar, Counsel for Appellant 
has either missed or ignored the important distinction 
between "rejection {pre-acceptance behavior) and revocation 
of acceptance (post-acceptance behavior)." White and Summers, 
p. 253. Counsel quotes a long passage from White and Summers, 
which states that "effective rejections" by the buyer give 
rise only to liability for damages, and not for an action on 
the price (Appellant's brief, p. 5). That is certainly 
correct, as we have already seen. But then White and Summers 
go on to discuss the appropriate remedy for "effective but 
wrongful revocations," and conclude that: 
any buyer who accepts goods is liable for the 
price unless he makes a procedurally ef-
fective and substantially rightful revo-
cation o~cceptance; we believe that a 
procedurally effective but substantially 
wrongful revocation should not free him 
from price liability under §2-709(l)(a). 
White and Summers, p. 213. 
-7-
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Likewise, on page 3 of Appellant's brief, Counsel 
quotes from Bender's Uniform Commercial Code Service, the 
following: 
When there is a rejection of goods, the 
buyer is not exercising any control or 
dominion over them, whether the rejection 
is rightful or wrongful. In essence, it 
would be essential for the seller, re-
gardless~of the cause of the rejection, to 
recover the goods from the carrier, bailee 
or-the buyer. He should take the appropriate 
action necessary to accomplish this purpose. 
Unfortunately, however, Counsel ended the quotation at 
this point and failed to continue: 
On the other hand, where there is a revocation 
of acceptance, this presupposes a prior acceptance 
by the buyer. The seller here should be entitled 
to the action for the purchase price because 
the goods are in the exclusive control of the 
buyer and the additional burden imposed upon the 
seller of reclaiming the goods is not necessarily 
well placed. 3A Bender's Uniform Commercial 
Code Service, 13-76 (1978). 
It should be remembered that Appellant never rejected 
the organ, either rightfully or wrongfully. Instead, he 
accepted it after having it in his home and under his exclusive 
control for two days, by making the down payment and by 
signing the Installment Sale Contract. Two days after he 
had accepted the organ, which was conforming, Appellant 
revoked his acceptance. Therefore, the quotations in Appellant's 
brief dealing with liability for damages caused by wrongful 
rejection, while accurate, are not relevant to the case at 
bar; for in fact there was no rejection, but instead a 
wrongful revocation of acceptance. Anderson suggests: The 
seller may recover the contract price with respect to accepted 
goods, as to which there has not been any rightful revocation 
of acceptance." Anderson, (Uniform Commercial Code, p. 401). 
-8-
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Nordstrom further observes: 
If the seller retakes the goods as the owner, 
he ought not also have the claim for their 
price under the 'goods accepted' provision of 
section 2-709. His remedy is under section 
2-708. Of course, if the seller refuses the 
attempted wrongful revocation, the goods are 
still the buyer's and the seller may recover 
the price. Nordstrom, Law of Sales, 544 (1970). 
Finally, Squillante and Fonseca have noted that "the 
action for price becomes due immediately upon the seller's 
delivery of the goods and the buyers default in payment of 
the purchase price." 3 Squillante and Fonse6a, Williston on 
Sales, 433 (1974). 
While admittedly many courts construing the law of 
sales have not spoken in precisely the terms of rejectio~ 
and revocation of acceptance, most have held that recovery 
of the contract price is allowed immediately after the buyer 
., 
purchases a conforming good. See for example D. A. Taylor Co., 
vs. Paulson, Utah 2d _______ , 552 P.2d 1274 (1976), in 
which the Utah Supreme Court observed simply that when a 
seller sold and a buyer ordered and accepted some carpet, 
the buyer was liable for the price. Other Courts, however, 
have in fact spoken in terms of acceptance and wrongful 
revocation of acceptance. In Beco, Inc., vs. Minnechange 
Golf Course, 5 Comm. Cir. 444, 256 A2d 522 (1968) the court 
held that when conforming goods have been delivered to, and 
accepted by, the buyer, the seller cannot sue for damages 
under §2-708 but must sue for the contract price under §2-
709. Likewise the court in Haken vs. Sheffler, 24 Mich. 
App. 196, 180 N.W. 2d 206 (1970) observed that §2-709 authorize' 
an action for the price when goods have been accepted, as 
contrasted with ~amages under §2-708, when there has been a 
-9-
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"non-acceptance" by the buyer. A Missouri court has held 
that an action for the price accrues to the seller when the 
goods have been accepted by the buyer. In that case the 
court specifically held that the seller was under no obligation 
under the Uniform Commercial Code to respossess or resell 
the air conditioners which the buyer had accepted simply 
because the buyer subsequently .revoked his acceptance. 
R. R. Waites Co., Inc., vs. E. H. Thrift Air Conditioning, Inc., 
510 S. W. 2d 759 (Mo. 1974). In the instant case the Appellant 
has wrongfully revoked his acceptance of the organ. But he 
should not be able to revoke his liability for the price 
under the contract. 
POINT IV 
ANY ERRORS MADE BY THE TRIAL COURT WERE HARMLESS. 
In his brief, Counsel for Appellant argues that the 
trial court's jury instructions where both erroneous and 
inadequate. Specifically he argues that since the court 
refused to read two sections .of the Uniform Commercial Code 
to the jury, counsel for Appellant was denied the opportunity 
to argue the elements of rejection .and acceptance. It seems 
unusual that counsel would blame the court for failing to 
raise an issue which he himself failed to raise at trial. 
Counsel was given ample opportunity to argue non-acceptance 
of the organ, but was preoccupied with trying to prove 
unconscionable selling techniques on the part of Respondent, 
and subsequent mental anguish on the part of Appellant. In 
his brief, counsel for Appellant cites Cervitor Kitchens, 
Vs. Chapman, 7 Wash. App. 520, 500 P.2d 783 (1972), which 
-10-
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held that the reasonable time for inspection of the goods by 
the buyer before he will be deemed to have accepted them is 
a.question of fact if the facts are disputed. In the 
instant case those facts simply were not disputed at trial, 
and there was no reason for the jury to decide something 
which was not in issue, regardless of whether, in retrospect, 
counsel wishes it had been. Counsel for Appellant failed to 
mention in his brief that the above cited case then went on 
to say that if, as here, the facts are undisputed concerning 
the duration of time for inspection by the buyer of the 
delivered goods, the question as to whether the buyer has 
accepted the goods and is therefore liable for the price, 
becomes one for the court to dec ide. See also LaVilla Fair vs. 
Lewis Carpet Mills, Inc., 219 Kan. 395, 545 P.2d 825 (1976). 
In the instant case the facts concerning the amount of time 
in which Appellant was given to reject the organ were undisputed. 
By agreement between the parties he was given two days. The 
court simply held, therefore, that as a matter of law, 
Appellant had accepted the organ, and was liable for the 
price (record, p. 122). 
As to counsel's exception to the "forced sale" instructior., 1 
it must be pointed out that even if, arguendo, the measure 
of damages was erroneous, it did not prejudice Appellant's 
case in any way. The jury decided the issue of unconscionabillt)' 
against Appellant, and therefore the question of damages or 
set-off to Appellant became a nullity. 
-11-
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As to Respondent's burden of proof, Respondent clearly 
alleged and proved the making of the contract and Appellant's 
subsequent breaching thereof. Any allegations of rejection 
or non-acceptance should have been raised at trial as an 
affirmative defense by Appellant. See Corbin, Contracts 
981, 698 (1952). 
CONCLUSION 
Since Appellant failed to contest at trial that he had 
accepted the organ, he should be estopped on appeal from 
claiming non-acceptance. Even if he is permitted to allege 
non-acceptance, however, the facts indicate that Appellant 
indeed did accept the organ, but later wrongfully revoked 
that acceptance. The appropriate statutes and all the 
authorities suggest that a wrongful revocation of a contract 
gives rise to an action for the price. It is therefore 
urged that the judgment of the Trial Court be affirmed. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
GARY N. ANDERSON 
175 East First North 
Logan, Utah 84321 
Attorney for Respondent 
Keith Jorgensen 
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